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n a large modern economy, there is a vast and constant movement of funds
in the conduct of commerce and ﬁnance. The channels through which
these funds move constitute the payment system, which, ultimately, forms
a network connecting all participants in the economy. In dollar value, the bulk
of this movement is not in cash but in the form of instructions for the crediting
and debiting of accounts held with public or private ﬁnancial institutions.1 As
a network for sending and receiving instructions, the payment system bears a
resemblance to transportation and, especially, communication systems. Accord-
ingly, many of the issues and questions that arise in discussions of markets for
payment services have parallels in discussions of these other markets.
Markets that are characterized as networks are often thought to be driven
by the existence of economies of scale. In the presence of scale economies, the
average cost of providing services declines with the size of the network and the
volume of trafﬁc it carries. The belief in such economies has motivated a long
history of direct government involvement and intervention in network markets,
from the operation of the postal service to the regulation of telecommunications
and transportation networks.
Much of the evolution of the structure of markets for payment services has
been driven by the desire of participants to take advantage of the economies
of network expansion. The most fundamental example is the replacement
of a system in which payments are made in currency directly between indi-
viduals to one in which payments are made through accounts with ﬁnancial
intermediaries. Speciﬁcally, a check-based payment system opened the door to
This paper has beneﬁted from the helpful comments of Bill Cullison, Jeffrey Lacker, Bruce
Summers, John Walter, and Tom Humphrey. The views expressed herein are the author’s and
do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve
System.
1 For a detailed description of the payment system, see Blommestein and Summers (1994).
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network efﬁciencies to be gained through the centralized exchange of checks
among banks in clearinghouses.2 More recently, some payments have moved
from checks into electronic forms of transmission. For instance, the use of
Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) payments, for such purposes as payroll direct
deposit, tripled in the number of transactions processed annually (from around
800 million to around 2.4 billion) from 1986 to 1992.3
In addition to technological factors, the evolving market structure in the
payment system has been greatly inﬂuenced by the policy of the Federal
Reserve System. Prior to 1980, many payment services were provided free of
charge by the Federal Reserve to its member banks. As a result, a majority
of payments cleared through the Federal Reserve, either directly or through
correspondent banks. The Monetary Control Act of 1980, among its provi-
sions, required Federal Reserve services to be made available, at a price, to all
institutions. The Reserve Banks were instructed to set prices to cover all direct
and indirect costs incurred in the provision of services. Since the institution of
pricing, the Reserve Banks have experienced losses in market share to private
providers. In check processing, for instance, renewed growth has occurred in
the activities of clearinghouses on local, regional and, most recently, national
levels. The resulting loss of market share by the Reserve Banks has been most
signiﬁcant among larger institutions.4
In the provision of ACH services, the Fed’s position is somewhat more
dominant than in check services. The Federal Reserve processed about 94
percent of all transactions in 1992 (McAndrews 1994). Private alternatives
continue to develop, however. As in the case of check processing, new compe-
tition and the potential for institutions to engage in direct (nonintermediated)
exchanges are focused on large-volume ACH users.
In the changing payment services environment, there have been a number
of proposals for the restructuring of Fed pricing. Proposals for market-sensitive
pricing tend to suggest advantageous pricing terms to large-volume users of
services. Any such scheme amounts to some form of price discrimination.
This term is purely descriptive: it applies to any pricing other than the setting
of a single price per unit sold that is available to all buyers. The simplest
example, referred to as two-part pricing, involves charging all buyers the same
combination of a ﬁxed fee and a per-unit price. When two-part pricing does
not “discriminate enough,” more complex schemes can be used. Examples in-
clude a per-unit price that varies with the quantity purchased and a schedule of
combinations of ﬁxed and per-unit charges among which buyers can choose.
2 Goodfriend (1990) discusses this change and how banks developed institutions for enhanc-
ing payments efﬁciency and dealing with the resulting credit risk.
3 McAndrews (1994) describes the growth in ACH payments.
4 The General Accounting Ofﬁce (1989) found that between 1983 and 1987 the Federal
Reserve lost market share only among banks with over $750 million in assets.      
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Price discrimination in response to market competition raises some im-
portant questions about Federal Reserve pricing policy. For instance, are the
Reserve Banks’ “business interests” in conﬂict with their public policy respon-
sibilities? Additional questions arise from the fact that price discrimination has
the tendency to favor some institutions, particularly larger institutions, over
others. Should the equal treatment of all banks be part of Fed pricing policy?
Of course, at the most basic level is the question of whether the Fed should
participate at all as a competitor with private providers of payment services.
This article argues that the public interest may be best served by a Federal
Reserve pricing policy that is responsive to competition, within certain limits.
This argument is based on the presumption that an important goal for Federal
Reserve policy is the resource efﬁciency of the payment system. An efﬁciency
perspective dictates that a loss of market share by the Federal Reserve is neither
good nor bad per se. What matters is the overall cost efﬁciency of the market.
If the Federal Reserve is replaced by providers with lower costs, then such a
change should be accommodated. The goal of pricing policy, however, should
be that only efﬁciency-enhancing losses are experienced.5
The central concept employed in this article is that of sustainable prices.6
Sustainable prices are prices designed to sustain an efﬁcient allocation of pro-
duction by giving no buyer an incentive to seek to obtain the product from
an alternative source. The following section brieﬂy describes the organization
and pricing in the markets for check clearing and ACH services. These two
markets can be broadly characterized by a high volume of low-value transac-
tions. As such, they make relatively intensive use of resources in transmitting
payment instructions and constitute large markets for transmission services.
The subsequent sections develop the notion of sustainable prices and use it to
draw conclusions about Fed pricing policy. In particular, sustainable pricing
can provide a guide for determining when market-sensitive pricing by the Fed
is and is not in the public interest.
It is important to note that resource efﬁciency is not the Federal Reserve’s
only public policy interest in the payment services market. Indeed, the Fed’s
primary concern is with the overall safety and reliability of the system. This
concern is expressed in the Fed’s regulatory oversight of arrangements used for
payment settlement. It is along the dimension of efﬁciency, however, that the
Fed’s role as a provider of many payment services should be evaluated. The
Fed’s participation should be determined by its ability to provide services in a
cost-effective manner.
5 While this article focuses on pricing, the terms of competition among alternative providers
are affected by a variety of other factors. For instance, in 1994 the Board of Governors adopted
a requirement of same-day settlement of checks presented by private collecting banks that put
private-sector processing on a more equal footing with Fed processing.
6 See Spulber (1989).      
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1. TWO PAYMENT SERVICES MARKETS IN BRIEF:
CHECKS AND ACH
The concept of sustainable prices, as developed below, applies to concentrated
markets.7 Hence, it is useful to establish at the outset that markets for payment
services tend to be fairly concentrated. In most of these markets, the Federal
Reserve has a signiﬁcant market share, while in some markets, the Fed’s share
is dominant. A brief description of the structure of two markets follows.
In 1992, over 72 billion noncash payments were made in the United States.
Of these, 80 percent were made by check.8 Checks are written on more than
15,000 banks and other depository institutions. In about 30 percent of all trans-
actions made with checks, the recipient deposits the payment in an account in
the bank on which the check is written. The clearing of these “on-us” items is a
simple matter; the bank merely debits the account of the payor and credits the
account of the payee (subject, of course, to the payor’s account having sufﬁ-
cient funds). The remaining 70 percent of check payments must clear between
banks. This clearing can proceed directly: a payee bank can send the check to
a payor bank in exchange for funds. Alternatively, check clearing can make
use of one or more of a number of intermediary services.9 One such service
is that provided by a clearinghouse. In a clearinghouse arrangement, a number
of institutions agree to exchange checks drawn on each other at a speciﬁed
place and time. Hence, a clearinghouse resembles multilateral direct exchange,
except in the way that payments are cleared. With each exchange of checks, a
clearinghouse member pays its net debit position or receives its net credit.
If a bank participates in a clearinghouse of any size or if it engages in
direct exchange with a large number of banks, it must have the capacity to sort
the checks it receives by payor bank. This task is performed by specialized
equipment, reader-sorter machines. If a bank chooses not to invest in sorting
capacity, it can, instead, send unsorted or incompletely sorted checks to an
intermediary institution that completes the collection process. Both the Federal
Reserve Banks and private collecting banks play this role. The collecting bank,
private or Fed, may sort and send checks to payor banks or to subsequent
collecting banks. For instance, a Federal Reserve ofﬁce sends within-district
checks to payor banks and out-of-district items to their respective Fed ofﬁces. In
1992, the Fed handled over 19 billion checks, about half of all checks requiring
interbank clearing.
The resource costs in the check-collection process are dominated by two
cost categories: the sorting and transportation of checks. Direct, bilateral
7 For a treatment of the wide variety of theories of behavior in concentrated markets, see
Tirole (1989).
8 The data cited in this section are from the Bank for International Settlements (1993).
9 The various paths for check clearing are reversed when a payor bank sends a “return item”
(a check returned because of insufﬁcient funds).      
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exchange of checks is the most costly means of clearing since it requires
the payee bank to sort and ship to a large number of endpoints. Concentration
of both activities can lead to cost savings. A group of banks that regularly
receive checks drawn on each other can economize through a clearinghouse
arrangement. Hence, the typical clearinghouse is composed of relatively large
institutions within a metropolitan area. When an institution does not internalize
the economies of concentration, it can instead purchase sorting and transporta-
tion services from entities that can take advantage of the cost efﬁciencies
available.
The use of Automated Clearinghouse transactions is relatively new. In an
ACH payment, the payor (or the payee with preauthorization by the payor)
gives direct instructions to the payor’s bank for the transfer of funds. Modern
electronic information technology has made this means of transfer particularly
cost-effective for recurring payments of set value. Accordingly, a growing frac-
tion of the work force has wage and salary payments directly deposited into
bank accounts by ACH. Other payments that might be made by ACH include
mortgage payments and insurance premiums.
As with checks, ACH payments must clear between banks when the payor
and the payee do not have accounts with the same institution. Clearing is
facilitated if the payor and payee bank share an electronic connection over
which instructions can be sent. Transactions can be made by direct bilateral
exchange, through a private clearinghouse, or through the Fed. The ﬁrst two
options are likely to be used primarily by pairs or groups of banks that share a
large number of payments. That is, private ACH transactions have been carried
out primarily within geographic regions, while for interregional payments, the
Fed has been the dominant provider. This market structure may be subject
to change, however, as a private, national ACH initiative has recently begun
competing with the Fed. In 1992, 94 percent of approximately 1.8 billion ACH
transactions were made through the Fed.
Current pricing of Federal Reserve check and ACH services is a form of
two-part pricing, a combination of a ﬁxed fee and a per-unit price. In check
services, the ﬁxed charge is the cash letter charge. A cash letter is a collection
of checks deposited with the Fed. The cash letter charge and the per-item fee
vary with the amount of sorting that has already been done by the depositing
bank and with the locations of the banks on which the deposited checks are
drawn. The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s price structure for 1994 in-
cludes cash letter charges between $2 and $3 for most checks, while per-item
fees range from less than 1¢ to 6¢.10 These different fee combinations apply to
varying amounts of sorting that may be necessary.
10 Larger cash letter and per-item charges are assessed for some special categories of checks.             
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The prices for ACH services also vary with the particular services pro-
vided. The basic fee structure in the Richmond Fed’s 1994 price list includes a
participation fee of $20 per account per month and transaction (per-item) fees
of 1¢ per intradistrict item and 1.4¢ per interdistrict item. In addition, a bank
must have electronic access to the system. Access is priced with a monthly fee
that ranges from $30 to $1000, depending on the type of connection maintained.
While electronic access allows institutions to receive other services as well, at
least part of the access fee can be considered the ﬁxed cost of engaging in
ACH transactions.
2. NATURAL MONOPOLY11
The main concepts to be employed can be demonstrated with a simple example
of a single service that can be provided by one or more sellers. Let qi be the
quantity provided to the ith out of N buyers. Denote by q the array of quantities
provided to all the buyers, q = (q1,q2,...qN), and let Q be the sum of the qi.
The total cost incurred by a single seller in providing the service is given by
C(Q) = F +
N 
1
fi + v(Q). (1)
The ﬁxed cost has two components. A general cost of F, the common ﬁxed cost,
is incurred by any seller providing any quantity of the service (e.g., the cost
of maintaining an accounting and communication system for ACH transfers).
In addition, there may be a cost of fi speciﬁc to the relationship with buyer
i (the cost of an individual bank’s electronic connection to the system). The
variable-cost function, v(Q), is increasing and convex.12
The basic ideas can be presented for the simple case in which only the
common ﬁxed cost, F, is present in equation (1). In this case, the relationship
between total cost and output might be represented as in Figure 1. The cor-
responding relationship between average cost and output is shown in Figure
2. This U-shaped average-cost curve exhibits economies of scale as long as
11 The case of natural monopoly is developed for expository purposes. The concept of
sustainable pricing can be extended to any market structure. The application to concentrated,
nonmonopoly markets closely parallels the case of natural monopoly. For instance, if all sellers
can operate at minimum average cost, then that minimum cost is the sustainable price.
12 It is worth pointing out that the N quantities (qi) speciﬁed above could just as easily
be interpreted as quantities of N different products. In that case, the variable-cost function v(Q)
might be replaced by a sum of separate cost functions, v(qi), for each of the individual products.
The concepts developed here to analyze pricing of a single product in the presence of economies
of scale are directly applicable to the pricing of a set of products in the presence of economies
of scope. Economies of scope are said to exist when the costs of joint production of a set of
products is less than the sum of the costs of separate production.     
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Note: Figure 1 displays a total cost curve with ﬁxed cost F and convex variable-cost function
v(Q). Figure 2 shows the corresponding average-cost function. The quantity Qe is the “efﬁcient
scale” at which minimum average cost ACe is achieved.       
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total output is less than the level labeled Qe.13 This level of output, at which
average cost is minimized, is referred to as the efﬁcient scale for the production
of the service. Above the efﬁcient scale, as average cost rises, there are dis-
economies of scale. For now, it is assumed that all sellers and potential sellers
have identical cost structures.
As in any market, pricing is affected by the structure of the market—e.g.,
the number and relative sizes of sellers. Market structure is, in turn, affected by
the nature of the cost function for producing the service. If the total quantity
demanded in this market was very large relative to Qe, then competitive pricing
and free entry among providers of the service would tend to result in a market
composed of a large number of providers, each producing about Qe. The price
in this competitive market would tend toward ACe in Figure 2. That is, when
efﬁcient scale is small relative to the size of the market, the invisible hand of
competition works well; production costs are minimized and price just covers
costs.
At the opposite extreme is the case in which a single seller’s efﬁcient scale
(Qe) is at least as large as the total quantity of service demanded by the market.
In this case, competition among active providers cannot enhance the efﬁciency
of production. Any division of output among sellers will only serve to raise
the overall economic costs of providing the service, by duplicating the ﬁxed
costs. This is a case of natural monopoly. Under the belief that competition is
infeasible, price regulation is often imposed on industries which are thought to
operate under the conditions of natural monopoly.
A natural focus for the pricing of the product sold by a natural monopoly,
subject to the requirement that revenues just match costs, is to set a per-unit
price equal to the average cost of producing the total industry output. Suppose,
in Figure 2, that this output level is Q . Suppose further that the quantity
demanded is independent of price. This assumption is not essential but allows
us to focus on the issue of whether or how the market quantity is divided
among sellers. The price that just covers costs is AC . Note that this price is
greater than the marginal cost of production, since average cost is declining
at Q ; when average cost is declining, marginal cost is less than average cost.
Since price deviates from marginal cost, average-cost pricing in such cases is
sometimes referred to as second-best pricing; “ﬁrst-best” pricing would equate
price to marginal cost, but would result in revenues less than costs. Second-
best pricing maximizes net social beneﬁts subject to the constraint that total
revenues from the sale of the product just equal total costs.
13 The average-cost curves should be understood as long-run average-cost curves. Although
all factors of production are variable in the long-run, ﬁxed costs are possible in the long-run if
a minimum (positive) level of some input is necessary for production of any positive amount of
output. For instance, to send telephone messages between two points, one must have, at least,
one telephone line connecting those points. This represents a ﬁxed cost, even in the long run.           
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Clearly, average-cost pricing in Figure 2 leaves no opportunity for a com-
petitor to attract some piece of the market and at least cover its costs. Any
piece of the market will involve average production costs greater than AC .
In order to win customers, however, a competitor would have to offer a price
below AC . In this case, uniform average-cost pricing (a per-unit price equal
to AC  available to all buyers) is not vulnerable to the entry of competitors.
There is another case that falls into the category of natural monopoly for
which pricing is more problematic. This case can be illustrated by a simple
example in which there are two buyers, Big (B) and Small (S). Buyer B uses
qB units of the service, while S uses qS. The total market quantity, then, is
qB+qS = QM. Again, in the present example, quantity demanded is independent
of price, except that each buyer seeks the lowest-cost supplier. The situation is
depicted in Figure 3. Market quantity lies in the range of diseconomies of scale,
and the average cost of serving the whole market is greater than the cost of
serving just buyer B (ACM > ACB). Although market quantity exceeds efﬁcient
scale, the market is still a natural monopoly; any division of the market would
result in higher total production costs. The average cost of serving only buyer
S is greater than the average cost of serving the whole market (ACS > ACM).

















Note: Although market quantity, QM = qS+qB, is greater than efﬁcient scale, the market is still a
natural monopoly; the cost of serving the entire market is less than the combined cost of serving
the market in any set of separate “pieces.”     
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In this example, a simple price structure would set a uniform price equal to
ACM, the average cost of serving the entire market. If there are no legal barriers
to entry, however, this price will induce a competitor to seek to gain a portion
of the market. Speciﬁcally, a competitor can target buyer B, offering a price
between ACM and ACB, the average cost of serving just buyer B. This strategy
allows the competitor to take advantage of the economies of scale available in
serving the large-volume user. Indeed, if no competitor were forthcoming and
if buyer B had access to the necessary technology, then the buyer would be
prompted to provide the service in-house.
A couple of comments on the competitor’s pricing strategy are useful to
bear in mind. First, the competitor must have reason to believe that the in-
cumbent monopolist cannot or will not rapidly adjust prices in response to the
competitor’s move. Such a belief might be justiﬁed if the incumbent’s pricing
is subject to a cumbersome administrative procedure. Second, the competitor
must be able to offer the lower price to a restricted set of buyers. If targeting a
segment of the market requires making private deals with individual buyers, the
competitor’s task will be simpler if it is possible to identify a relatively small
number of buyers with large enough volume to take substantial advantage of
available economies of scale.
If the large-volume user defects to a competing source for the service,
what becomes of the small-volume user? If the incumbent continues to offer
the service at the price ACM, then buyer S is just as well off as before. This
price, however, no longer covers costs, which are now ACS. Assuming the
incumbent must cover costs, its price must rise. If it is resigned to serving
only the remaining customer, S, then the incumbent must set its price at ACS.
Note that the end result may be an inefﬁcient market structure. If there are
two sellers operating, one serving buyer B and the other serving buyer S, then
the duplication of ﬁxed costs in serving the market constitutes social waste.
The story may not end here. The incumbent may seek to win back some or all
of the market share lost. This counterattack may ultimately succeed, but even
temporary production by more than the efﬁcient number of sellers is socially
inefﬁcient.
3. SUSTAINABLE PRICES
Are there pricing strategies for the incumbent that leave no room for encroach-
ment by competitors? In the above example, the incumbent was vulnerable,
because one buyer was charged a price that was greater than the cost of serv-
ing that buyer alone. The cost of serving only some subset of the buyers in a
market is referred to as the stand-alone cost for those buyers. Accordingly, a
set of buyers will be receptive to alternative sources of a service unless they
face a price that is no greater than their stand-alone cost. A pricing scheme
that meets this requirement for all sets of buyers is called a sustainable pricing      
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scheme. Sustainable prices leave no opportunity for a competitor with identical
costs to capture any segment of the market.
How should one set prices that just cover costs and result in efﬁcient
production? In the case of natural monopoly, efﬁcient production requires a
single producer. In this case, the task is to ﬁnd prices that recover costs and
are sustainable. When market quantity is smaller than efﬁcient scale, as in
Figure 2, a uniform (per-unit) price equal to the average cost of producing the
market quantity does the job. When market quantity is greater than efﬁcient
scale, as in Figure 3, there is no uniform (nondiscriminating) price that can
satisfy both sustainability and cost recovery. On the other hand, a variety of
nonuniform price structures can achieve the desired goals. One simple form for
such pricing would be to give each buyer (or class of buyers) a distinct price.
While this approach may not be practical in all circumstances, it is used here
for illustrative purposes.
As deﬁned above, sustainable prices generate total revenue that is nec-
essarily no greater than total cost, since total cost is the stand-alone cost for
the whole market. Sustainability, however, does not rule out prices that yield
total revenue less than total cost. The Federal Reserve Banks operate under
the requirement, from the Pricing Principles developed by the Board of Gov-
ernors pursuant to the Monetary Control Act, that revenues be sufﬁcient to at
least cover all costs (the cost-matching requirement). Adding this condition to
sustainability necessarily results in revenues that exactly match total costs.
One implication of cost-matching, sustainable pricing is that at least one
buyer must be given a price lower than stand-alone cost. Suppose, in the ex-
ample of Figure 3, that buyer B is charged its stand-alone cost, in the form of
a per-unit price of ACB = [F + v(qB)]/qB. If both buyers are to be served, the
revenue that needs to be collected from buyer S in order to just recover total
costs is
[F + v(qB + qS)] − [F + v(qB)]. (2)
Here, the ﬁrst term is the total cost of serving both customers, while the second
term is the stand-alone cost of serving the large-volume customer. The differ-
ence between these two terms is referred to as the incremental cost of serving
customer S. This cost is denoted by ICS in Figure 4. Hence, the revenue needed
from buyer S can be collected with a per-unit price equal to ICS/qS. If buyer S
is charged anything less than this price, then in order to recover costs, the seller
must charge more than ACB. If B is charged more than ACB, a competitor will
take B’s business.
It is important to note that incremental cost, as the term is used here, is
not the same as marginal cost. The former, as indicated by equation (2), is the
cost of providing a particular quantity to a particular buyer, given the quantity
being provided to other buyers. The latter is simply the cost of providing an
additional unit of the product, without regard to the identity of the recipient. It      
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Note: C(qB) is the stand-alone cost of serving buyer B, while C(QM) is the total cost of serving
the entire market. The difference between the two, denoted ICS, is the incremental cost of serving
buyer S.
is possible to have a pricing structure in which the (marginal) price charged to
some buyers is less than marginal cost while no buyer’s average price is less
than its average incremental cost.
The price discrimination just described requires that buyers be segmented
into groups according to some observable characteristic. This task may not
always be straightforward. For instance, the quantity of services used by an
institution may be subject to signiﬁcant change over time. In that case, setting
a price to a buyer based on the buyer’s previous behavior may not yield the
desired results of tailoring prices to current demand conditions. Fortunately,
the desired segmentation can typically be achieved by pricing schedules that
allow buyers to self-select into groups. One example is “option pricing,” in
which buyers are given a choice between a schedule with a high ﬁxed charge
and low fee per unit and a schedule with a low ﬁxed charge and high fee
per unit. For the two-buyer example, Figure 5 illustrates the total expenditure          
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Note: The lines labeled ES and EB give the total expenditures (as a function of quantity purchased)
resulting from buying services under the two alternative options. Under one option, given by ES,
the buyer pays no ﬁxed fee and pays a per-unit price of PS = ICS/qS, which is the slope of the
line ES. This price generates expenditures by buyer S equal to incremental cost. The other option,
given by EB, includes a positive ﬁxed fee and a lower per-unit price (slope). The key features
of the schedule EB are that it meets the total cost curve C(Q) at the quantity qB and that it lies
below ES at qB. Hence, buyer B prefers the schedule EB and has a total expenditure equal to
stand-alone cost, C(qB). The ﬁxed fee in the schedule EB must be (and is, as drawn) high enough
so that buyer S prefers the schedule ES.
schedules generated by such pricing options. In this example, the low ﬁxed fee
is actually set at zero and combined with a per-unit price of PS = ICS/qS.A n
individual buyer will choose the option for which its own total expenditures
are the smallest. Hence, the low-volume buyer selects the low ﬁxed charge and
high per-unit fee, which is constructed so that total expenditures by buyer S
just cover incremental costs. Buyer B selects the other schedule, resulting in
expenditures equal to stand-alone cost.
The desired results also could be achieved by a pricing schedule with
volume discounts, in which the per-unit fee varies with the quantity purchased.        
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The total expenditure schedule from one such price structure is given in Figure
6. This price schedule sets a price of ICS/qS for the ﬁrst qS units purchased.
For each additional unit purchased beyond that threshold, the buyer pays the
lower price of [C(qB) − ICS]/(qB − qS). As Figure 6 indicates, this volume-
discounting scheme is designed to collect exactly stand-alone cost from buyer
B and incremental cost from buyer S.
An option pricing scheme, like that presented in Figure 5, has recently
been adopted on a trial basis by some Federal Reserve Banks for some check-
processing services. Most prices for Reserve Bank services, as discussed in
Section 1 above, are a simpler form of two-part pricing, including a single
ﬁxed fee and a single per-item charge. This form of pricing is not as ﬂexible
















Note: Like Figure 5, Figure 6 presents a pricing arrangement that results in expenditures equal
to stand-alone cost for buyer B and incremental cost for buyer S. This arrangement involves no
ﬁxed fee. The per-unit price is ICS/qS on the ﬁrst qS units purchased. For each subsequent unit
purchased, a lower price is charged. This lower price is equal to [C(qB) − ICS]/(qB − qS). The
resulting total expenditure, as a function of quantity purchased, is given by the kinked line, E.   
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as an option pricing schedule. Accordingly, sustainability may or may not be
achievable with simple two-part pricing.
In summary, sustainability requires that no buyer (or set of buyers) faces
prices greater than stand-alone costs. Adding the cost-matching condition re-
quires that no buyer (or set of buyers) faces prices less than incremental costs.
That is, each buyer must face a price between stand-alone and incremental cost.
Within these restrictions, the relative pricing to different buyers can be treated
in a variety of ways. In the examples above, buyer B is charged stand-alone
cost and buyer S is charged incremental cost. Consequently, all of the ﬁxed
costs of production are allocated to buyer B. This allocation could be reversed,
charging stand-alone cost to buyer S and incremental cost to buyer B. Price
schedules that allocate some ﬁxed costs to each buyer face both buyers with
prices in between stand-alone and incremental costs. The concept of sustain-
ability, by itself, gives no guide to the choice among these alternatives. The
next section suggests that the possibility of technological differences among
alternative providers of a service can help to sharpen the choice.
4. BYPASS AND TARGETED COMPETITION
The forgoing development of sustainable prices assumes that the same technol-
ogy is available both to the incumbent ﬁrm (the Fed) and to any potential or
actual competitors. Hence the relevant cost standard for deterring entry is the
stand-alone cost of a market segment. There may be instances in which some
segment of the market can be served with a technology different from that used
by the incumbent seller. In such cases, the term “stand-alone cost,” as deﬁned
above, is somewhat of a misnomer. This cost is the cost to a buyer, or group
of buyers, of obtaining services from a source with a cost structure identical to
the incumbent’s. When the alternative to the incumbent’s network involves a
substantially different technology, the buyer’s option is not so much to “stand
alone” as to “bypass” the network.
An example, as described by Einhorn (1987), is in the provision of long-
distance telephone services. Most long-distance calls are routed through the
local telephone company, for which a charge is assessed. Large-volume callers,
however, may exercise the option to bypass the local company and connect
directly with their long-distance provider. The technology for bypassing the
local network and, therefore, the costs associated with doing so are different
from those associated with connecting through the network.
One can also think of obtaining payment services from alternative sources
as bypassing the Federal Reserve network. For instance, a local check clear-
inghouse utilizing centralized exchange of items involves a different pattern of
sorting and transportation expenditures from that arising in the use of the Fed’s
check-clearing services. Of course, in this regard, the most stark example of
bypassing the Fed’s network is direct bilateral exchange of payments.      
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The presence of a bypass alternative places additional constraints on the
pricing choices facing the incumbent seller. Continuing with the example of
Section 2, suppose that there are two buyers with quantities demanded of qS and
qB and the sum of these quantities is denoted QM. Buyers B and S can bypass
the incumbent and receive the service at a cost of C∗
B and C∗
S, respectively. The
incumbent seller’s total cost of serving the entire market is CM = F + v(QM),
while buyer B (S) alone can be served by the incumbent for the stand-alone cost
of CB = F+v(qB)( CS = F+v[qS]). Suppose that the bypass technology is po-
tentially attractive only to a large-volume buyer, so that C∗
B < CB but C∗
S > CS.
On the other hand, suppose that the market is still a natural monopoly. This is
so if when buyer B bypasses the system, total costs rise, or CM < CS+C∗
B. This
last statement is equivalent to saying that the incumbent’s incremental cost of
serving buyer B is less than the bypass cost, since ICB = CM − CS < C∗
B.
Under the conditions just described, the incumbent is limited in how much
of the common ﬁxed costs can be allocated to buyers with a viable bypass
option. Recall that allocating all of the (common) ﬁxed costs to a single buyer
amounts to charging that buyer its stand-alone cost. Here, such a price to
buyer B would induce B to bypass the incumbent, to the detriment of market
efﬁciency.
The incumbent’s pricing problem is further complicated if there is some
uncertainty about the viability of the bypass technology. Suppose, for instance,
that the incumbent is reasonably sure that C∗
S > CS but is uncertain as to
the value of C∗
B. If buyer B’s bypass cost is so low that it is less than the
incremental cost of serving B, then it is efﬁcient to let buyer B bypass. Indeed,
in this case, there are no prices that the incumbent can set to cover costs and
guarantee against the loss of buyer B. On the other hand, it is still possible
to price in such a way that buyer B will be lost only if bypass is efﬁcient.
Speciﬁcally, pricing to buyer B at incremental cost and buyer S at stand-alone
cost will succeed in covering costs regardless of whether B is retained. Further,
by comparing its bypass and incremental costs, B makes its choice in a way
that minimizes the total (social) costs of serving the market.
To summarize, the presence of bypass options that are potentially attractive
to some individual buyers or groups of buyers limits the ways in which ﬁxed
costs can be recovered from buyers. Especially when the value of the bypass
option is not fully known by the incumbent, prices to segments of the market
that are likely to have the most attractive bypass options should be pushed
down to the incremental cost of serving those segments. Such an allocation of
ﬁxed costs is likely not to coincide with the allocations implied by standard
accounting practices, and it may strike some (especially other buyers) as in-
equitable. It is important, however, to consider the alternative. If the incumbent
seeks to recover some of the ﬁxed cost from likely candidates for bypass, those
buyers may turn to alternative sources even when it is socially inefﬁcient to
do so. If their business is lost, the incumbent will still have to recover ﬁxed      
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costs from the remaining buyers. This result would be less cost-efﬁcient and
no more equitable than the result of sustainable pricing that recovers all ﬁxed
costs from those buyers with the least attractive alternatives.
5. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON SUSTAINABLE PRICES
While this article has presented sustainable pricing as a tool for evaluating pric-
ing from a public policy point of view, the concept originated as a predictive
notion in the theory of “contestable markets.”14 Contestable markets theory
holds that in the presence of potential competition, incumbent ﬁrms will not
be able to charge anything other than sustainable prices; any attempt to charge
unsustainable prices would quickly prompt entry of and loss of market share
to a competing seller. In other words, even in a natural monopoly, there are no
economic rents earned by an incumbent monopolist. This is a strong conclusion
that has not been broadly accepted without qualiﬁcation. Most importantly, one
cannot discuss the effects of potential entry without considering the likely re-
sponse to entry by the incumbent seller. In its purest form, contestable markets
theory assumes that the incumbent can alter its price in response to entry only
with some lag. The incumbent’s inability to respond quickly leaves an oppor-
tunity for an entrant to capture, at least temporarily, some part of the market
should the incumbent’s prices be unsustainable. Ultimately, the incumbent may
regain the market, but the absence of sunk costs implies that even temporary
proﬁt opportunities will be exploited by entrants.
In an unregulated market populated only by private ﬁrms, there is lit-
tle reason to suppose that ﬁrms do not have a great deal of ﬂexibility in
adjusting their prices to competitive conditions. The situation of a Reserve
Bank, however, may come closer to that imagined by the contestable markets
theory. Clearly, the process necessary to adjust pricing policy is time-
consuming. Reserve Banks must set and publish prices once each year. Further,
the Board of Governors’ Pricing Principles, adopted pursuant to the Monetary
Control Act, state that substantive changes in the structure of prices or services
offered shall be made subject to public comment. Volume-based pricing for
check services (on a limited basis) was approved by the Board in November
1993 and became effective in January 1994, “subject to additional staff analysis
and public comment” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 1994a).
When price adjustment is subject to lags, then prices that are not sus-
tainable can attract entry, even if the market cannot efﬁciently support the
additional seller(s) in the long run. Hence, the use of unsustainable prices can
attract excessive entry when entrants can take advantage of an incumbent’s
administrative delays in responding to competition.
14 See Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982).    
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It is also useful to compare sustainable prices to a pricing concept often
used in discussions of regulatory price setting. In such discussions, one ap-
proach is to seek prices that maximize social welfare, subject to a zero-proﬁt
constraint for the seller. The “social welfare” to be maximized is a measure of
the beneﬁts (e.g., utility or proﬁts) received by buyers. The resulting prices are
referred to as Ramsey prices, because their derivation follows Ramsey’s (1927)
formulation of optimal taxation. Sustainability is a stronger constraint than zero
proﬁts. Hence, Ramsey prices will not, in general, coincide with sustainable
prices. Accordingly, the former might be more applicable to the problem of
setting prices in the public interest when an incumbent seller is protected from
competition by legal barriers to entry.
Unlike Ramsey prices, the notion of sustainability used here is entirely
cost-based; it does not take into account a measure of the beneﬁts generated by
the provision of payment services. A cost-based speciﬁcation of sustainability
is exact when demands for services are assumed to be perfectly inelastic. The
more general speciﬁcation would require that the net value provided to any
group of buyers (beneﬁts to buyers less payments to seller) be no less than the
greatest net value those buyers could obtain from an alternate source. While
this generalization is a direct extension of the basic idea, measures of beneﬁts
on the demand side of a market may be difﬁcult to obtain. Hence, the cost-
based notion of sustainability may remain useful as a practical approximation
to the more general concept.
6. ARE PAYMENT SERVICES MARKETS
NATURAL MONOPOLIES?
Sustainable pricing is presented above in the context of a market that is a
natural monopoly. Neither of the markets discussed above, check and ACH
services, is a monopoly, although the ACH market comes close. Even the
market for check services, however, is fairly concentrated; in any given geo-
graphic region, the Federal Reserve serves a signiﬁcant share of the market for
intraregional processing. Market structure is determined in part by the degree
of scale economies relative to the size of the market. Hence, a concentrated
market is likely to be one in which demand and technology conditions are such
that only a small number of sellers is viable. In such a market, the analysis of
sustainable pricing closely parallels that of natural monopoly.
The analysis offered in this article does assume that a seller’s efﬁcient scale
is at least a sizeable fraction of the size of the market. Hence the applicability
of the pricing principles proposed above is partly an empirical matter. Speciﬁ-
cally, what evidence exists on the signiﬁcance of scale economies? There have
been a number of studies of the Federal Reserve’s check-collection services,     
J. A. Weinberg: Selling Federal Reserve Payment Services 19
aimed at addressing this question.15 These studies tend to ﬁnd fairly weak scale
economies in the observed range of production levels.16 Such ﬁndings might
seem at odds with the narrative description of the experience in check pro-
cessing (and in ACH services), which seems to parallel the analysis of Section
2; average-cost pricing to the market as a whole led to the defection of high-
volume users of the services. One possible conclusion is that the alternative
means used by defecting customers do, in fact, deliver the services with lower
real resource costs. That is, these users may have access to a superior bypass
technology. In that case, the Fed’s loss of market share would be efﬁciency-
enhancing. On the other hand, the analysis of Figure 3 refers to a case in which
the incumbent operates above efﬁcient scale. If this case were an accurate de-
scription of the Fed priced-services environment, then one would not expect to
ﬁnd empirical evidence of widespread, unexploited economies of scale.
Aside from economies associated with check processing, there may be
scale efﬁciencies in the distribution and transportation of processed checks.
Fixed costs that are speciﬁc to each endpoint served may result in markets
where efﬁcient scale is a sizeable fraction of the relevant market.
There is also the possibility that economies exist less in increasing the
scale of production of any given service than in the joint provision of multiple
services. This is the most common use of the term “economies of scope.”
For instance, a single electronic connection to a Reserve Bank can allow a
customer to use ACH services and other electronic services, including new
electronic check-collection options. To the extent that scope economies exist, it
may not make sense to talk about market structure, pricing, and cost recovery
on a product-by-product basis. The concept of sustainable prices, however, can
be directly extended to an environment with economies of scope. Consider the
pricing of an array of services. For such pricing to be both sustainable and
cost-matching, no service to any buyer or group of buyers can be priced above
stand-alone cost or below incremental cost. Here, stand-alone cost is the cost
of providing only a speciﬁc subset of the services to a speciﬁc subset of the
buyers. Similarly, incremental cost refers to the added cost of a speciﬁc subset
of services to a subset of buyers, given the services already being provided to
other buyers. As before, choices among sustainable price conﬁgurations amount
to choices among possible allocations of common ﬁxed costs across buyers
and services. If a particular service is targeted for competition (for instance,
because of the availability of a bypass technology speciﬁc to that service), then
that service’s price should be set at incremental cost.
Even if the structure of cost and demand is such that these markets are not
natural monopolies, the concept of sustainable prices can still provide a useful
15 A recent example is Bauer and Hancock (1992).
16 If, as these studies suggest, the average-cost curve is relatively ﬂat at its minimum, then
average-cost pricing should be close to sustainability.      
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benchmark for Reserve Bank pricing policy. The cost structure in a market
might be such that the efﬁcient number of sellers is greater than one but still
small. For instance, if the market quantity sold tends to be about three times the
efﬁcient scale of production, then the efﬁcient number of sellers is three. In such
a “natural oligopoly,” pricing behavior tends to be the result of a complicated
dynamic game. Here, the administrative structure that governs Reserve Bank
pricing can be advantageous in that it may give the Federal Reserve the ability
to precommit to a pricing strategy over a long horizon.17 When the Fed is
one of several competitors, it can contribute to the efﬁciency of the market by
adopting a clear pricing policy to which other sellers can react. Speciﬁcally,
the Fed could make it known that it stands ready to sell to any market segment
at no greater than stand-alone cost and no less than incremental cost. Within
these bounds, it will adjust pricing to respond to competition, moving prices
in more competitive segments toward incremental cost. Such a strategy makes
it clear that market gains by competitors that reduce overall social costs will
not be contested, while those that raise costs will not be accommodated. Under
sustainable pricing, a seller cannot preserve market share that is not justiﬁed
by its technological capabilities.
7. SUSTAINABLE PRICING AND
THE MONETARY CONTROL ACT
The move toward market-sensitive pricing that responds to competitive condi-
tions might raise questions about the role of the Federal Reserve in the provision
of payment services. To what extent should a Reserve Bank behave like a
private business? Does an attempt by a Reserve Bank to maintain its share
of the market interfere with its public policy objectives with regard to the
payment system? To the latter question, the discussion in this article suggests
the answer, “Not necessarily.” By letting its prices be guided by the notion
of sustainability, the Federal Reserve establishes a benchmark for the market
place. If competition targets a particular segment of the market, that segment
should be served by the Federal Reserve at incremental cost. Then, any gains
in market share by competitors will also be in the public interest. It is also
worth noting that no market segment is being subsidized by another as long as
no price is less than incremental cost.
It is important to note that the pricing behavior suggested herein is, in many
cases, not the behavior one would expect from a private business. That is, the
resulting pricing is not the pricing that would prevail in the market if the Fed
played no operational role. Private businesses are motivated by long-run proﬁt
17 A treatment of the beneﬁt of precommitment in oligopoly pricing games can be found in
Tirole (1989).     
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maximization. This may lead to deviations from sustainable prices in a number
of ways. First, an incumbent ﬁrm facing potential entry can set prices to any
market segment above stand-alone cost, as long as the incumbent has adequate
ﬂexibility to adjust its prices in response to entry. In other words, revenues
can more than cover costs. Second, there may be situations in which a private
ﬁrm will be willing and able to set prices that fail to recover all costs in the
short run. Suppose, for example, that two ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves in competition
in a market that has the cost and demand structure of a natural monopoly.18
In the long run, only one of the ﬁrms can remain in the market. To determine
which ﬁrm will survive, the two might engage in a “war of attrition” in which
prices are below costs and losses are incurred until one ﬁrm chooses to exit.
The short-run pricing would necessarily involve some prices to some market
segments below incremental cost. While the Monetary Control Act does allow
the Fed to have revenues that fall below costs in the short run, the Board of
Governors has adopted the policy of setting prices each year with the aim of
recovering all anticipated costs for that year (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve 1994b).
Unlike the pricing behavior of a private business, market-sensitive, sustain-
able pricing is motivated not by proﬁt maximization, but by an interest in the
overall efﬁciency of the market for payment services. This motivation drives
pricing as close as possible to the “ﬁrst-best” result of marginal-cost pricing
of all products to all buyers. The constraints that keep pricing away from that
goal are the need to cover costs and the need to ensure that market share is lost
only when the loss results in lowering the resource costs of serving the entire
market.
Does a pricing policy that results in disparate treatment of banks conﬂict
with the goals of Congress in writing the pricing requirement into the Mon-
etary Control Act? The language of the Act instructs the Federal Reserve to
“give due regard to...t h eadequate level of [services] nationwide.” Since
the sustainable pricing schemes outlined above tend to involve average and
marginal prices that decline with the volume of services purchased, it appears
that such pricing will favor large institutions, because small banks would pay a
higher average price. Hence, disparate treatment, in the form of higher average
prices, might be thought of as impeding smaller institutions’ access to services.
The language in the Monetary Control Act could conceivably be interpreted as
prohibiting pricing that faces some institutions with a greater cost of access to
services. In the presence of economies of scale or scope, pricing that achieves
equal treatment of all buyers and just recovers costs is typically not sustain-
able. Hence, if the Monetary Control Act is interpreted strictly as mandating
18 For instance, a market that could previously support two ﬁrms might experience a perma-
nent decline in demand.   
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equal treatment, the Federal Reserve could ﬁnd itself in an intractable bind; if
uniform, unsustainable prices result in signiﬁcant loss of business, the Reserve
Banks could have difﬁculty covering costs without raising prices to remaining
buyers. The result would be equal treatment by the Fed but disparate treatment
by the market as a whole.
While the language of the Monetary Control Act may or may not be read
as providing a mandate for equal treatment, it does seem to dictate a continued
role for the Fed in the provision of payment services. Without such a legislated
dictum, one might legitimately wonder whether there is a necessary role for
the Fed in these markets. Indeed, the central result in the theory of contestable
markets, as noted above, is that the force of potential competition among private
businesses is sufﬁcient to yield sustainable prices. On this point, experience in
deregulated transportation and telecommunication markets has been inconclu-
sive. These markets tend to be highly concentrated, and strategic interaction
may tend to result in ﬂuctuation between collusive and aggressively competitive
behavior. In such an environment, it is conceivable that a single large provider
committed to a sustainable pricing policy could provide a stabilizing inﬂuence
on the market while promoting an efﬁcient market structure.
8. CONCLUSION
This article proposes a general principle for evaluating Reserve Bank pricing
strategies. The concept of sustainable pricing under conditions of scale and
scope economies appears to be a useful tool. Sustainable prices that just cover
total costs price all services to all customers in between their stand-alone and
incremental costs. When competition from private-market providers is focused
on a subset of services and customers, sustainability retains enough ﬂexibility to
respond to competitive pressures by pushing some prices down to incremental
cost. This response is particularly appropriate in conditions of uncertainty about
competitors’ costs.
A strategy of market-sensitive sustainable pricing would result in loss of
business to competitors only when such loss is efﬁcient. Hence, this strategy
provides a guideline for responding to competition in a way that respects the
requirements of the Monetary Control Act while promoting efﬁciency in the
delivery of payment services. If the Federal Reserve is going to be in the pay-
ment services business, it should use its position as a provider motivated by the
public interest to guide the market in the direction of efﬁciency. Sustainable
prices provide market participants with a benchmark for assessing the cost ef-
fectiveness of alternative modes of service delivery. Following this benchmark
may or may not stem the Fed’s loss of market share, but maintaining market
share should not be a goal of Fed policy. The Fed’s market share should be
whatever is consistent with the efﬁcient operation of the payment system.    
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